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ARGUMENT
I.

AS THE U.S. SUPREME COURTfS RECENT DECISION IN PENSON
V. OHIO MAKES CLEAR, MR. DUNN WAS PREJUDICIALLY DEPRIVED
OF HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON APPEAL
In Penson v. Ohio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4020 (U.S., Nov. 29,

1988), the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed and revitalized its
decision in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

The

Court held that the Ohio Court of Appeals erred in granting
Penson's counsel leave to withdraw from his criminal appeal
without first determining, based on an Anders brief and the
court's independent review of the record, both that counsel
had conducted a "conscientious examination of the case" and
that there were'no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The Court
further ruled:
Most significantly, the Ohio court erred by failing
to appoint new counsel to represent petitioner after
it had determined that the record supported "several
arguable claims. " App. 41. As Anders unambiguously
provides, "if [the appellate court] finds any of
the legal points arguable on the merits (and
therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision,
afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to
argue the appeal."
57 U.S.L.W. at 402

(citation omitted^.

The principles of Penson clearly establish that Mr. Dunn
was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel on appeal
by the substantial failure of both his counsel and this Court
to adhere to the Anders requirements.
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While an Anders brief

ostensibly was filed on Mr. Dunn's behalf, that brief was
woefully inadequate for the reasons discussed in detail in
Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this appeal.

Certainly, it was

inadequate to support a finding either that counsel had
conducted a "conscientious examination" of the case or that
the

appeal

was

wholly

frivolous.

Nor

did

this

Court

specifically so find. State v. Dunn, 646 P.2d 709, 711 (Utah
1982 ) . Instead, this Court made the conclusory ( and incorrect)
finding that "counsel has complied in every respect with the
'Anders' requirements" and granted the motion to withdraw.
Then, without benefit of competent adversary presentation of
the issues, the Court rejected the claims raised in both the
Anders brief and the pro se brief as being "without merit."
Id.

As demonstrated in Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this

appeal, some of the claims raised on his direct appeal were
meritorious.

Under Penson, this Court should have either

denied Mr. Taylor's motion to withdraw or appointed substitute
appellate counsel.

The Court's failure to do so "deprived

both the petitioner and itself of the benefit of an adversary
examination and presentation of the issues."

57 U.S.L.W. at

4022.
Of further significance here is Penson's holding that
it is inappropriate to apply either the prejudice requirement
of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), or the
harmless error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.

2

18 (1967), to a violation of Anders that leaves a defendant
without representation during an appellate court's decisional
process, such as occurred here.

Such a violation, unlike a

case in which the defendant is afforded counsel but the
assistance

rendered

is ineffective, wholly

deprives

the

defendant of his right to counsel on appeal, and is thus
presumptively prejudicial.

57 U.S.L.W. at 4023.

Thus, Mr.

Dunn was deprived of his right to counsel on his direct appeal
by this Court's failure to appoint him substitute appellate
counsel and that deprivation was prejudicial.

Having been

prejudicially deprived of counsel on his direct appeal, Mr.
Dunn's failure to raise any issue on direct appeal cannot
preclude review of his habeas corpus petition.
In its brief, the State wholly ignores the performance
of Mr. Dunn's counsel.

Rather, the State repeatedly points

to the pro se brief Mr. Dunn filed on his direct appeal,
implying that a pro se brief somehow remedied any and all
deficiencies in his counsel's performance.

Under Penson,

however, Mr. Dunn is legally presumed to have been prejudiced
by the deprivation of counsel on appeal and his pro se attempts
to raise issues despite that constitutional deprivation are
irrelevant.
Moreover, it cannot reasonably be contended that Mr.
Dunn's attempt to argue his case pro se compensates for the
denial of his right to counsel on appeal. Notably, the State
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does not even attempt to demonstrate that the quality of Mr.
Dunn's brief was comparable to that of a brief prepared by
competent counsel.

Rather, the State erroneously relies on

the simple fact that a pro se brief was filed.

But, as

reiterated by the Supreme Court in Penson,
Absent representation, however, it is unlikely that
a criminal defendant will be able adequately to test
the government's case, for, as Justice Sutherland
wrote in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
"[even] the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. "
Id., at 69.
* * *

As we stated in Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387
(1985):
"In bringing an appeal as of right from
his conviction, a criminal defendant is
attempting to demonstrate that the
conviction, with its consequent drastic
loss of liberty, is unlawful.
To
prosecute the appeal, a criminal appellant
must face an adversary proceeding that - like a trial -- is governed by intricate
rules that to a layperson would be
hopelessly forbidding. An unrepresented
appellant -- like
an
unrepresented
defendant at trial --is unable to protect
the vital interests at stake." 16.. , at
396.
57 U.S.L.W. at 4022.
Thus, the very basis of the sixth amendment right to counsel
on appeal is the presumed inability of the criminal defendant
to adequately represent himself on appeal.

Mr. Dunn's pro

se brief gives no reason to doubt the soundness of that
presumption.
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Under Anders and Penson, Mr. Dunn's right to counsel on
appeal was unconstitutionally denied and he is entitled to
a

new

appeal

from

his

conviction

and

sentencing.

Unfortunately, the original record in Mr. Dunn's criminal case
has been completely destroyed by the State.
the proceedings

below

it was discovered

First, during
that

the court

reporter's notes from the sentencing hearing on the second
degree murder conviction were lost by Sevier County and could
not be located despite a court-ordered search.

R. 15, 23,

24, & 51. Then, after Mr. Dunn's opening brief on this appeal
was prepared and filed, the remaining portions of the record
were transmitted to the Attorney General's office, where they
were destroyed.

See, letter from David B. Watkiss to R. Paul

Van Dam dated January 13, 1989, attached as Addendum

M

A" .

A copy of the trial transcript has been obtained from the
county attorney (see, letter from Dan R. Larsen to Geoffrey
J. Butler dated January 23, 1989, attached as Addendum "B")
and is now on file with this Court.

As of the date of this

Reply Brief, however, other critical portions of the record
have not been recovered. Vital portions still missing include
the papers filed with the court, all trial exhibits (including
the inflammatory photographs admitted into evidence against
Mr. Dunn), and the transcript of the preliminary hearing (in
which the circumstances of the search and seizure of the
bullets

admitted

into

evidence
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against

Mr.

Dunn

were

established).

If

this

record

cannot

be

recovered,

a

constitutionally adequate review of Mr, Dunn's conviction
and sentencing cannot now be afforded and this Court must
reverse Mr. Dunn's conviction and grant him a new trial.
II.

A DEPRIVATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON
APPEAL IS CLEARLY SUBJECT TO POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
REGARDLESS OF A FAILURE TO RAISE IT ON DIRECT APPEAL
In response to Mr. Dunn's contention that he was denied

his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
the State contends that various precedents of this Court
reject the proposition that ineffective assistance of counsel
on appeal may constitute good cause for a procedural default.
The State cites Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah
1983), a case also relied upon by Mr. Dunn.

Although

correctly citing Codianna for the narrow proposition that not
all deficiencies in counsel's performance constitute "unusual
circumstances" so as to warrant collateral review of issues
that could have been raised on direct appeal (State's brief
at 7), the State ignores the gravamen of the Codianna opinion:
where counsel's performance is so deficient as to violate
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel, habeas review is mandated despite a failure to raise
the issue on direct appeal.
If counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous
to deprive petitioner of the effective assistance
of counsel, they constituted a violation of due

6

process that is clearly reviewable on appeal or by
postconviction review.
660 at P.2d 1105.x
Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Penson, the
outright denial of Mr. Dunn's sixth amendment right to counsel
on appeal, unlike a case such as Codianna based on ineffective
assistance of counsel alone, is presumptively prejudicial.
Thus, the principle established by Codianna that a denial of
the right to counsel will excuse the failure to raise a claim
on direct appeal and permit collateral review of the claim,
applies even more forcefully here.
The narrow exception to the procedural default rule
based upon the sixth amendment right to counsel and adopted
by this Court in Codianna is mandated by the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986),
discussed at pages 16 to 17 of Mr. Dunn's opening brief, a

1

In Codianna, this Court reviewed the performance of
the petitioner's trial counsel, but ultimately dismissed the
petition because no sixth amendment violation was found.
Highly incriminating evidence adduced at trial assured
Codianna's conviction despite deficiencies in his counsel's
performance. Presumably, had the Court found that Codianna
was prejudiced by his counsel's performance at trial, it would
also have found that his appellate counsel's failure to raise
the ineffectiveness issue also constituted a violation of
his sixth amendment right, thus excusing the technical
procedural default. See, United States ex. rel. Barnard v.
Lane, 819 F.2d 798 (7th Cir. 1987) (trial counsel's failure
to tender jury instruction on defendant's only defense of
justification violated defendant's sixth amendment right;
appellate counsel equally ineffective for failure to raise
issue on appeal; grant of habeas corpus petition affirmed).
7

decision not even mentioned in the State's brief.
Rather, the State emphasizes this Court's decision in
Hafen v. Morris, 632 P.2d 875 (Utah 1981), which might, at
first blush, be construed to contradict Codianna. This Court's
reference to Hafen in Codianna may indicate, however, that
the two decisions are reconcilable. A careful reading of the
opinions reveals critical distinctions between Hafen and both
Codianna and the case at hand.

See, 660 P. 2d at 1105.

In

Hafen, the sole basis for petitioner's claim of ineffective
assistance

of

counsel

was

counsel's

alleged

failure

to

challenge a juror who petitioner knew and to raise that issue
on appeal.

Noting

that the petitioner

had an adequate

opportunity to complain about counsel's alleged failure both
in the trial court and in lengthy direct appeal proceedings,
this Court held the claim waived.

Id. at 876.

Unlike the

claims at issue here and in Codianna, the claim in Hafen might
reasonably be viewed as within the ability of a layperson to
adequately raise without the assistance of trained legal
assistance.

Moreover, given satisfactory performance of

counsel in all other respects, the single alleged deficiency
in Hafen probably did not rise to the level of a sixth
amendment violation.
In the final analysis, however, the continued viability
of Hafen must be seriously questioned in light of the later
Codianna decision and the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Murray
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v. Carrier, supra.2

To the extent Hafen or any other Utah

case holds to the contrary, it must be overruled.
III. COLLATERAL REVIEW OF CONVICTIONS UPON A SHOWING THAT
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO APPELLATE COUNSEL HAS BEEN
VIOLATED WILL NOT JEOPARDIZE THE FINALITY OF CRIMINAL
JUDGMENTS
Fantasizing a never-ending stream of post-conviction
petitions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel claims
as a result of granting relief to a single petitioner in this
case, the State urges this Court to affirm the district court
in order to keep the floodgates closed.

On examination,

however, the State's imagined flood evaporates.
Certainly an overburdened judiciary and the finality of
judgments are legitimate concerns. The exception to the direct
appeal rule urged here, however, is an extremely narrow one
that does not seriously undermine those concerns.
First, this case is unusual in important respects.

As

discussed in Point I above, Mr. Dunn was not merely denied

Other decisions supporting an exception to the
procedural default rule based upon the sixth amendment right
to counsel are United States ex. rel. Barnard v. Lane, 819
F.2d 798, 801-05 (7th Cir. 1987) (M[w]hen a constitutional
claim is waived because of ineffective assistance of counsel,
the responsibility for the default is imputed to the state
under the sixth amendment," icl. at 801); Gray v. Greer, 800
F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1985) (reissued Sept. 25, 1986); United
States ex. rel. Garner v. McEvers, 690 F. Supp. 635, 637 n.2
(N.D. 111. 1988); Deutscher v. Whitley, 663 F. Supp. 793, 79596 & 799 (D. Nev.), reh'g denied, 671 F.Supp. 1264 (1987)
(defendant's procedural default excused in habeas corpus
proceeding where counsel was ineffective for not raising claim
on first appeal and post-conviction proceeding).
9

effective assistance of counsel, but was wholly deprived of
the assistance of counsel on appeal by the failure of counsel
and this Court to adhere to the requirements of Anders on his
direct appeal.

Presumably, such cases are relatively few in

number and strict adherence by the courts to the Anders
safeguards -- adherence which Penson requires -- can all but
eliminate such claims.
Secondly,

claims

based

solely

upon

the

ineffective

assistance of counsel must pass muster under the restrictive
Strickland test.

Although certainly many habeas petitions

may be filed, given the low threshold of performance and the
show of prejudice required by Strickland, relatively few will
warrant review.
Finally, in cases involving indigent defendants, the State
may effectively limit the number of ineffective assistance
claims by

requiring

appeals

to be handled

by

different

appointed counsel than trial counsel, thus providing for an
independent review of trial counsel's performance.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO REVIEW THE TRIAL
RECORD BEFORE SUMMARILY DISMISSING MR. DUNN'S CLAIM OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL ON APPEAL.
At Point II of its brief, the State argues that because

Mr. Dunn's criminal trial record is not a part of the record
on this appeal, this Court must presume regularity in the trial
proceedings.

The reason the trial record was excluded from
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the record on appeal is obviously that it was never filed in
the proceedings below.
regularity

Far from supporting a presumption of

in the trial proceedings, the absence of the

criminal trial record from the district court file supports
only a finding of error in the proceedings below.
A habeas corpus petition based upon a claim of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel for failure to raise particular
issues simply cannot be resolved without a review of the trial
record.

In Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1985)

(reissued Sept. 11, 1986), the district court denied the
defendant's

habeas

corpus

petition

claiming

ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel without reviewing the trial
record.

The court of appeals reversed, explaining:

When a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is based on failure to raise viable issues, the
district court must examine the trial court record
to determine whether appellate counsel failed to
present significant and obvious issues on appeal.
* * *

Respondent may well be correct in its assertion
that appellate counsel strategically chose not to
raise certain issues on appeal. We hold only that
the determination of whether the decision was
strategic requires an examination of the trial
record.
Id. at 646.

Thus, the district court erred in summarily

dismissing Mr. Dunn's habeas corpus petition without first
reviewing the trial record and the briefs filed on Mr. Dunn's
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direct

appeal

to determine whether Mr, Dunn was denied

effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
The district court's order should therefore be reversed
and this case remanded for a determination of Mr. Dunn's claims
based upon a review of the trial record, unless such a review
has now been precluded by the State's destruction of the
record.

In that event, this Court should reverse Mr. Dunn's

conviction and grant a new trial.
DATED this (j ^"day of February, 1989.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

DAVID B / WATKISS
DEBRA j(/ MOORE
CAROLYN COX
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant Robert W. Dunn were
mailed, postage prepaid, to Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this
^ ^ a y of February, 1989.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

LAW O F F I C E S

WATKISS £ C A M P B E L L
^
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i-j ;

BY HAND

Honorable R. Paul Van Dam
Utah State Attorney General
Utah State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: Dunn v. Cook. Case No. 88 0067 (S. Ct.)
Dear General Van Dam:
At the request of Chief Justice Hall, we represent plaintiff-appellant Robert Dunn
in the above-captioned Supreme Court appeal of the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
Following the filing of appellant's brief in September of 1988, our office transmitted the
transcript of the original trial court in which-Mr. Dunn was convicted to your office for use
in preparation of the State's brief. After receiving the State's brief, Carolyn Cox of our
office called Dan R. Larsen, Assistant Attorney General, to obtain the trial court record
back for use in preparing our reply brief and so that we could have the record properly
placed before the Supreme Court.
Upon reaching Mr. Larsen, he informed Ms. Cox that the original record had been
irretrievably lost by the State. Mr. Larsen reports that the record apparently was taken out
with the trash, and its loss not discovered until the record had been destroyed. We were
not informed of this fact when it happened, but were only told when our office called to
retrieve the record.
We assume that the State's destruction of this critical record was inadvertent.
However, it was seriously negligent and the State's failure to inform our office promptly
raises other serious questions. Most critical, however, destruction of the record may

WATKISS & C A M P B E L L

Honorable R. Paul Van Dam
Page 2
January 13, i'W

irreparable and unfairly prejudice Mr. Dunn. We expect that prompt remedial action will
be taken, if remedial action is possible. Furthermore, if replacement of the original trial
court record is not possible, we will seek the release of our client on those grounds, as
meaningful review of our client's habeas corpus petition and appeal will be impossible
without the trial record.
Sincerely,

DAVID B. WATKISS
DBW:sjh
cc:
Hon. Geoffrey Butler
Dan R. Larsen, Esq.
Robert Dunn

bcc:

DJM
CC
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January 23, 1989

Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Court
Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

Dunn v. Cook, Case No. 880067

Dear Mr. Butler:
In response to the attached letter dated January 13,
1989, from David B. Watkiss to R. Paul Van Dam, the original
trial transcript and court record from Mr. Dunn's 1980 murder
conviction have been irretrievably lost by our office. However,
because these documents were not a part of the record in the
habeas trial court nor are they a part of the record on appeal,
their loss is immaterial to the present appeal.
In any event, a copy of the trial transcript has been
obtained from the Sevier County Attorney's Office and delivered
to Mr. Watkiss. Copies of the pleadings will also be made
available ones received from the Sevier County Attorney's Office.
It has further come to my attention that Mr. Dunn is
personally in possession of a copy of the trial transcript given
to him by his former counsel Marcus Taylor. Thus, Mr. Dunn has
not been prejudiced in preparing his Reply Brief.
Regarding the lost originals, my law clerk unwisely
placed the cardboard box containing the transcript and record
near the waste can in my office. He had been researching issues
on the case and was returning the transcript as well as
submitting his research memo. That evening, the custodian
apparently removed the box believing it to be waste. I was
unaware that the box had been returned to my office or discarded
by the custodian until several days later. Once discovered,

236 STATK CAPITOL

•
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Geoffrey Butler
January 23, 1989
Page 2
ray law clerk and two custodian supervisors emptied the capitol's
large waste crusher and searched for the box and its contents.
Unfortunately, they were never recovered.
If the Court wishes further information, please notify
me.
Very truly yours,

DRL/pa
Enclosure
cc:

R. Paul Van Dam
David B, Watkiss

